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ABSTRACT 
 
Ad hoc networks are the special networks formed for specific applications. Operating in ad-hoc mode 
allows all wireless devices within range of each other to discover and communicate in a peer-to-peer 
fashion without involving central access points. Many routing protocols like AODV, DSR etc have been 
proposed for these networks to find an end to end path between the nodes. These routing protocols are 
prone to attacks by the malicious nodes. There is a need to detect and prevent these attacks in a timely 
manner before destruction of network services.  
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Network Protocols, Wireless Network, Mobile Network, Ad-hoc Networks, Routing Protocols, Security, and 
Attackers. 
   
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ad hoc Networks are the networks formed for a particular purpose. These networks assume that 
an end to end path between the nodes exists. They are often created on-the-fly and for one-time or 
temporary use. They find their use in special applications like military, disaster relief etc that are 
in a need of forming a new infrastructure less network with all pre-existing infrastructure being 
destroyed. Characteristics of Ad hoc networks include: 
  
1) Lack of fixed infrastructure: An ad-hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not rely on 
pre-existing infrastructure for their connectivity. So these types of networks are flexible and 
easily reconfigurable. 
 
2) Limited resources: Due to lack of fixed infrastructures, these networks have limited resources 
for their use. Resources like battery power, bandwidth, computation power, memory etc have 
to be used judiciously for the survival and proper functioning of the network. 
 
3)   Dynamic Topology: Nodes in the ad hoc networks are often mobile wireless devices like    
laptops, PDAs, smart-phones etc resulting in frequent change of their location, resulting in a 
dynamic topology. 
 
 4)   Autonomous Networks i.e. stand-alone self-organized system: Due to their decentralized 
nature, these networks eliminate the complexities of infrastructure setup, enabling devices to 
create and join networks "on the fly" anywhere, anytime, for any application. A node in the 
ad hoc networks can communicate with all other nodes which are in its transmission range. 
Nodes in the network are self-sufficient for the purposes like routing application messages, 
assuring security of the network and so on. 
 
5)  Cost effective: All the above described features make these networks cost effective by 
removing the necessity of servers, cables for internet connectivity, routers etc.  
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Figure 1 : An Example of Ad Hoc Networks 
 
An example of ad hoc networks is shown in Figure.1. Here ad hoc network is being established 
by communication between wireless mobile nodes A, B, C, D, E, F and G. Node A wants to send 
a message to another node E in the network. Routing in the network for such a scenario takes 
place through multiple intermediate relay hops present in between A and E, assuming that all 
nodes in the network are trustworthy. Since A and B are in the wireless range of each other, A 
sends the message to B, B and C are in range of each other so message will get passed to C and so 
on till the message finally reaches E via the path A, B, C, G and E. 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II explores the various routing protocols in 
ad-hoc networks. Section III highlights the various security issues involved. Network attacks are 
categorized in Section IV. Section V presents the various routing attacks. Section VI concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS (MANETS) 
 
The main goal of routing protocols in ad hoc networks is to find out the optimal path with 
minimum overhead, minimum bandwidth consumption and minimum delay between the source 
and the destination node. As most of the nodes in ad hoc networks are wireless mobile nodes, the 
topology of such type of a network does not remain fixed. As a result, it becomes the node's 
responsibility to regularly discover the network topology in order to route the messages properly. 
Therefore, there is a need for various routing protocols to discover an optimal path from the 
source to the destination. A single routing protocol cannot work optimally in different network 
scenarios. A need is therefore felt for an appropriate protocol selection taking in consideration 
different network parameters such as density, size and the mobility of the nodes. 
  
On the basis of the network topology, the routing protocols in MANETS are broadly categorized 
as Proactive Routing Protocols, Reactive Routing Protocols and Hybrid Routing Protocols which 
are discussed as follows: 
 
1. Proactive Routing Protocols - In the proactive routing protocols, routing is done using the 
information present in routing tables maintained at each node i.e. table driven routing. These 
tables are exchanged on a periodic basis between the nodes. Each entry in the table contains the 
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information of the next hop for reaching to a node or subnet and the cost of this route. Since 
information of the neighboring nodes is maintained at each node, the time for route selection 
becomes minimal.  
 
Following are the problems from which pro-active routing algorithms suffer: 
 
a) Dynamic topology of the network results in some frequent changes in the routing table 
resulting in invalid routes as the new routes cannot be updated very frequently. As a result, there 
is a slow reaction on restructuring and hence, the failures of links. 
b) Increase in network size results in increase in size of routing table which in turn increases the 
network load while updating or exchanging tables. 
 
Scenarios for which these types of protocols are best suited are: 
 
i) Lesser node mobility   
ii) Lesser density or fewer nodes 
iii) Small sized networks. 
 
Various pro-active routing algorithms are Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [10], Landmark 
Routing Protocol (LANMAR) [11], Topology Broadcast based on Reverse Path Forwarding 
(TBRPF) [12] etc.   
 
2. Reactive Routing Protocols - In case of Reactive Routing protocols, the routing is done 
by the nodes only on demand i.e. only when the node needs to send a message. The sender floods 
its neighbors with Route Request (RREQ) packets to find route in the network. Any 
destination/intermediate node in the network having path to the destination will reply back with 
Route Reply (RREP) to the sender and the routing is accomplished.  
 
These suffer from following disadvantages: 
 
a) There is a time delay in finding the routes since a large number of control packets have to be 
exchanged before the exchange of actual data. 
b) Network congestion may result due to excessive flooding of packets. 
 
Reactive Routing find their applications in the following network scenarios: 
 
i) High mobility networks. 
ii) Medium size networks.Various Reactive routing algorithms are Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance-
Vector (AODV)[13], Dynamic MANET On Demand (DYMO)[14], Admission Control enabled 
On demand Routing (ACOR)[15]. 
 
3. Hybrid Routing Protocols - Hybrid Routing Protocols takes the advantage of both 
reactive and pro-active routing algorithms. In the initial stages, the nodes identify the routes using 
some pro-active algorithms and later on uses reactive algorithms for on demand routing. Both 
pro-active and reactive nature of the protocol can be used interchangeably depending on the 
different network scenarios. Since neither pure proactive nor the reactive approach can alone 
handle all the network requirements, so the hybrid approach may be in general the optimal choice. 
 
The main disadvantages of such algorithms are: 
 
i) Number of activated nodes determines the advantage that can be taken   
ii) Reaction to the traffic demand depends on the gradient of traffic volume.  
Various Hybrid routing algorithms are Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [17], Zone-Based 
Hierarchical Link State (ZHLS) [16], etc.  
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4. SECURITY ISSUES 
 
The MANETS set new challenges for network security and the need of an hour is to pay more 
attention to the security threats posed on the network. Following are the concerned issues in 
security of ad hoc networks: 
 
1. Nodes Acting as Routers: As nodes themselves are participating in relaying of messages, 
any malicious node in the network can easily misuse the message traffic either by 
dropping messages or by generating false messages etc. 
2. Limited Resources: Due to the limitation of network resources in mobile ad hoc 
networks, the various cryptographic solutions applicable to wired networks are not 
directly applicable. Therefore there is a need for new security solutions which can find 
their application in this challenging domain.  
3. Mobility of Nodes: Dynamically changing network topology results in more opportunities 
for the malicious nodes to attack. 
4. Location of Nodes: Since Ad hoc networks are formed for a purpose, the deployment 
environment may not be very security sensitive. For Example, the nodes deployed in the 
battlefield or in the forests for tracking wild animals etc. may invite many security threats 
and attacks.  
5. Wireless Medium: Interoperability is very easy in a wireless medium. Therefore, there is 
a lack of privacy and the important messages can be eavesdropped and modified easily. 
 
Some basic security constraints that must be considered and implemented in Wireless ad hoc 
networks are: 
 
1) Confidentiality: Confidentiality in the network must be implemented to prevent the 
disclosure of any part of the information to unauthorized entities during the transmission 
of data. Certain sensitive applications of ad hoc networks may face devastating 
consequences if confidentiality is not taken care of.  
2) Integrity: Integrity is violated when a message is actively modified in transit. The 
network should be able to maintain the integrity so that the unauthorized entities are not 
able to modify/corrupt any message.    
3) Availability: The main purpose for formation of any network is to exchange information. 
This network security constraint ensures the data availability in the network. This 
constraint can be violated by the denial of service attacks (DoS) in the ad hoc networks. 
4) Authenticity: Authenticity ensures that a node is a genuine or trusted node in the network. 
Without authentication any malicious node can deceive a genuine node and thus can have 
an access to the confidential information. 
 
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation ensures that no node can refuse the action that it has performed 
i.e. each node take the responsibility of its actions. This property of the network allows the faulty 
node detection and hence helps in its isolation from the network. For e.g. when a node X receives 
a message with its integrity constraint violated from another node Y then X can declare Y as a 
malicious node. 
  
5. CATEGORIZING NETWORK ATTACKS 
 
Attacks on the ad hoc networks can be broadly categorized as Passive Attacks and Active 
Attacks. 
 
1. Passive Attacks - The main aim of passive attackers is to steal the valuable information 
from the targeted networks. Attackers do not disturb the normal network functioning like 
inducing false packets or dropping packets. They simply become a part of the network but 
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continuously keeps an eye on the network traffic thus in turn violating the message confidentiality 
constraint. Since they do not initiate any malicious activity to disrupt the normal functioning of 
the network, it becomes very difficult to identify such attacks. Examples of such types of attacks 
are traffic analysis, traffic monitoring and eavesdropping. 
 
2. Active Attacks - Active attackers tamper with the network traffic like cause congestion, 
propagation of incorrect routing information etc. Due to their active participation, their      
detection and prevention can be done using suitable prevention algorithms. Examples of passive 
attacks include modification attack, impersonation, fabrication and message replay. 
 
Attacks can also be classified depending upon the position of the attacker in the network. 
 
1    External attacks 
External Attacks are the attacks made by the unauthorized nodes which are not a part of the 
network. External attackers can flood bogus packets in the network, impersonation etc. Their aim 
can be to cause congestion or to disrupt normal network functioning. 
2 Internal attacks 
Internal Attacks are caused by the authorized nodes in the network. The reason for their malicious 
behavior may be the following: 
a) Hijacking those (authorized) nodes by some external attacker and then using them for 
launching internal attacks in the network. 
b) Selfishness to save their limited resources like battery power, processing capabilities, and the 
communication bandwidth and exploiting other nodes for their benefit. 
 
6. ROUTING ATTACKS  
 
5.1. Flooding Attack 
 
It is the basic form of Denial of Service (DoS). The aim of this attack is to paralyze the whole 
network by exhausting network resources like bandwidth of the network, battery of nodes. Radio 
jamming and battery exhaustion methods are the tools to conduct this attack in the network. It can 
be caused in some of the following ways:  
 
1. Attackers may initiate massive bogus route request (RREQ) packets that will definitely be 
rebroadcast on and on by other nodes. Bogus may be in the sense that the destination address does 
not exist in the network. As there will not be any reply for these RREQs, network will be flooded 
leading to the consumption of battery power and bandwidth of all nodes. For example, consider a 
simple network scenario shown in Figure 2. Here node D generates RREQ packets  destined to 
the node address H, which is actually not present in the network and broadcast it to all 
neighboring nodes(C, G and E) in the network. Since no neighbor node will be able to find H, 
they will again rebroadcast it assuming that some other nodes may be able to find the path to 
 
1. H. In this way battery power and bandwidth are being wasted without doing any useful 
work with RREQ flooding. 
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Figure 2 : Example of Flooding Attack 
 
2. Analogous to RREQ flooding, a malicious node can do data flooding also. In this 
technique after setting path to all the nodes, attacker node sends useless data packets to them. 
Detection of flooding attack can be done in following ways: 
 
 The detection of any attack can be performed with the cooperation of genuine nodes in 
the network. For detecting the presence of a malicious node responsible for RREQ flooding in the 
network, rate of packet (or RREQ) generation of any node should be checked by the neighboring 
nodes. If the rate exceeds some threshold value (set either statically or dynamically by the 
algorithm) that node should be put into the blacklist and this information should be broadcasted in 
the network as proposed in [2, 3, 4, and 5]. 
 
 Similarly for the prevention of data flooding, a threshold for data rate generation by any 
node in the network is to be set and should be checked periodically for all the neighboring nodes 
in the network as proposed in [6]. 
 
Some of the recent approaches that solve this attack are presented as follows: 
 
In [6], authors have proposed solutions for both the types of flooding (RREQ flooding and data 
flooding). They categorized all system nodes as strangers, acquaintances and friends depending 
on the trust level which is calculated using various parameters like association length, ratio of the 
number of packets forwarded successfully by the neighbor to the total number of packets sent to 
that neighbor, ratio of number of packets received intact from the neighbor to the total number of 
received packets from that node, etc. The trust relation between the above categorized nodes is as 
follows: Trust threshold (friend) > Trust threshold (acquaintance) > Trust threshold (Stranger). 
 
For the prevention of RREQ and data flooding, different thresholds are being set for different 
node categories like if Xrs, Xra, Xrf denotes RREQ flooding threshold for a stranger, 
acquaintance and friend node respectively, then their values satisfy the given mathematical 
relation Xrf > Xra > Xrs. Similarly if Yrs, Yra, Yrf denotes the DATA flooding threshold for a 
stranger, acquaintance and friend node respectively then Yrf > Yra > Yrs. After reaching the 
threshold level, further RREQ and data packets will not be entertained from the sending node.  
 
Thus results in prevention from both RREQ and data flooding from the malicious nodes in the 
network. 
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5.2. Sleep Deprivation Attack  
 
Sleep deprivation attack is a type of flooding attack where either a specific node or a group of 
nodes is targeted whose resources need to be exhausted. This attack can be implemented by 
forcing the targeted node to use its vital resources e.g. battery, network bandwidth and computing 
power by sending false requests for existent or non-existent destination nodes. In the mean time it 
cannot process the requests coming from genuine nodes. The main aim of the malicious node is to 
minimize the genuine nodes lifetime by wasting its valuable resources. As a result the victim 
node is not able to participate in routing mechanisms and become unreachable by other nodes in 
the network. 
 
As an example, consider the network scenario in Figure 3 where a malicious node C is exhausting 
the resources of node D by sending bogus data packets or bogus RREQ packets for processing. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of Sleep Deprivation Attack 
 
Some of the proposed solutions to the sleep deprivation attack are: 
 
1)A clustering based prevention method is proposed by Sarkar et al. in [18] which suggest the 
formation of clusters in the networks as in least cluster change algorithm. It proposes that the 
node with the lowest node identifier number is assigned the cluster head. The cluster head is 
updated whenever two cluster heads come in direct contact. A cluster head should forward 
packets for a particular source-destination pair in its cluster until a threshold value (say 10 
packets) is reached. After that the cluster head breaks its connection with that node. In this way, it 
results in preventing a node from sending excessive traffic. 
 
2) Another solution as proposed by Bhattasali et al. [19] uses a hierarchy based model for the 
detection of sleep deprivation attacks in sensor networks. All sensor nodes in the network are 
arranged in a hierarchy of Sink gateway (SG), Cluster In-charge (CIC) having maximum energy 
level and maximum degree of connectivity in the cluster, Sector Monitor which is nearest 
neighbour of the CIC having maximum detective capability for an anomaly, Sector In-charge 
(SIC) having maximum energy level among all neighbours of CIC and collects sensing data from 
a sector) and Leaf nodes (LN) having capability to sense data. 
 
The whole network is logically divided into clusters, headed by CIC and clusters are further 
divided into sectors headed by SIC. Data collection request is initiated by the CIC and sent to the 
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SIC which forwards this request to its associated LNs. LNs in turn returns the sensed data to SIC 
which forwards the collected data to the SM. SM checks for the validity or non-validity of the 
collected data and sends the packets marked as valid or non-valid to the CIC. CIC takes the final 
decision for preventing the rate of false positive detection. Then it forwards valid data to the SG 
along with rejecting the non-valid data. Also suspected node gets added into the SG's isolation list 
for future prevention. 
 
5.3. Black hole Attack 
 
The term “black hole” suggests a node which absorbs all information passing through it by not 
forwarding it to the destination node. As a result of the dropped packets, the amount of 
retransmission needed increases leading to congestion.  A black hole attacker misuses the routing 
protocol to tamper the normal working of the network in the following ways [7, 8]: 
 
[1] A black hole node after receiving the RREQ packets for a particular destination sends the 
route reply (RREP) packet, with modified higher sequence number to the source claiming that it 
is the destination. Source after getting this pseudo RREP sends all the data to this attacker node. 
 
[2] It can also send false RREP packet to the source to advertise that it has the shortest path 
to destination. A black hole can easily intercept the packets for a particular destination. As an 
example, consider Figure. 4 as a network scenario with F as a black hole attacker intercepting 
packets of node E. When it receives a RREQ packet for E say from A, then it replies back to A 
with a RREP packet informing that it is having shortest path to E. Now as per working of AODV 
routing protocol A assumes that shortest path to E is from F and sends all the data destined for E 
to F which in turn will drop those packets. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: An Example of Black Hole Attack 
 
Detection of black hole attack can be done in various ways. First is by overhearing the actions of 
all neighbor nodes as in [8]. Authors in [20] suggest two solutions for prevention of the network 
from black hole attacks which are presented as follows: 
 
a) First algorithm finds more than one route (at least three) to the destination node. Sender 
sends RREQ packets to its neighbors. All the intermediate nodes (including malicious node as 
well as destination node) will reply to this pinged packet. Source then waits for receiving a 
number of paths having some common intermediate nodes in between it and destination. Using 
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these shared nodes, it can confirm a safe route to the destination and transfer the buffered data 
packets. If it does not get any shared nodes in between, it will wait for more route replies RREP 
packets from the neighbors hoping it will get one with shared nodes soon. This approached 
suffers from drawbacks like time delay in finding more routes and selecting the safest one. 
Moreover no shared nodes in existing routes results in no data forwarding. 
 
b) The second approach used in [20] ensures that each node maintains two additional tables, 
one for keeping the last-packet-sequence-number of the last packet received from every node and 
other is for keeping the last-packet-sequence-number of the last packet sent to each node. When 
the source broadcasts a RREQ packet, all the intermediate nodes, including malicious nodes and 
destination, reply with their respective RREPs containing the last-packet-sequence-number 
received from the source node. By analyzing these RREPs packets, source can easily identify the 
malicious nodes' reply. 
 
Another approach used by Umaparvathi et al. in [21] proposes two tiers secure AODV 
(TTSAODV) routing protocol which is an extension over AODV protocol. Basic assumption used 
in this protocol is the existence of a strong symmetric key distribution among the nodes of the 
network. Security is ensured in two levels of routing algorithm, first is during the route discovery 
phase and second is during the data forwarding phase. In tier 1 security, the previous and the next 
hop of any intermediate node, who has replied the source with the RREP packet, exchanges the 
verification messages to verify that the next hop of the intermediate hop is also having the fresh 
path to the destination. This ensures that the intermediate node is not a malicious node. They 
claimed that proposed tier 1 security algorithm is capable of detecting all single black hole 
attackers present in the network. Similarly for detecting collaborative black hole attack, tier 2 
protocol is used. In this protocol, before starting the actual data transmission a number of control 
messages are exchanged between source and destination. Source then waits for an 
acknowledgement from the destination within a threshold time. If the acknowledgement comes 
within this threshold time period, data transfer process begins assuming the path as trusted one 
otherwise that particular route will be avoided for the data transfer process. 
 
5.4. Rushing Attack 
 
The term “rushing” suggests that the attacker will speed up to become a hop of the path to a 
targeted node. This is done by forwarding RREQ quickly than the authorized nodes to increase 
the probability that routes discovered will be the ones including attacker. It can thus tamper the 
message traffic passing through it. This type of attack can be caused in the following ways [9]: 
 
 An attacker can enhance its forwarding speed by flooding the neighboring nodes with 
bogus RREQ packets in order to slow their processing speed. 
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Figure 5:  An example of Rushing Attack 
 
Consider a scenario in Figure 5 where node A requests for the route to node E by sending RREQ 
packets. Now D which is a rushing node, after getting the RREQ request engages other nearby 
node G by sending bogus RREQ packets which in turn slows down the processing speed of G. 
Taking advantage of that, D becomes the part of the route from A to E. 
 
 Attacker can also speed up its RREQ packets transmission by transmitting them at higher 
transmission power, thus decreasing the number of hops required to reach the destination. 
 
[9] described a set of generic mechanisms that together defend against the rushing attack 
which are secure Neighbor Detection, secure Route delegation and randomized ROUTE 
REQUEST forwarding. 
 
5.5 Impersonation Attack 
 
There is no proper authenticated mechanism to join an ad hoc network. Impersonation Attack is 
caused when any adversary node joins and takes the identity of a trusted node in the network. It 
then starts damaging the authentication constraint of the network. In this the attacker node uses 
address (IP or MAC) of some legitimate node in the network for its outgoing packets resulting in 
receiving of the messages which are for that node. Such a malicious node can also spread fake 
routing knowledge and gains inappropriate access to confidential data of genuine nodes, and 
becomes an authorized entity in the network. 
  
An attacker can impersonate an authorized node as follows: 
 
1) By guessing the identity details of the authorized node or, 
2) By disabling other node’s authentication mechanism.  
Consider the network scenario in Figure 6 where node D sends packets to its neighbors(C and G) 
with source address as E because of which any packet coming for E through C and G will now be 
directed to the malicious node D instead of E. 
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Figure 6: An Example of Impersonation Attack 
 
SAODV [22] can be used with digital signatures to prevent impersonation attacks on 
MANETS. 
 
5.6 Routing Table Poisoning Attack 
 
Routing Table Poisoning attacker corrupts the routing tables of other nodes in the networks 
resulting in the creation of false routes, sub-optimal routes, formation of loops, and congestion in 
portions of the network and also in network partitioning. This poisoning of routing tables can be 
done in following ways as proposed by the authors in [1]: 
 
 Attacker broadcasts false traffic and creates bogus entries in other nodes routing tables. 
 An attacker generates RREQ packets with high sequence number resulting in deletion of 
legitimate routes with low sequence number. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: An Example of Routing Table Poisoning Attack 
 
Consider the network scenario in Figure 7, where a malicious node D corrupts the routing tables 
of nodes C, G and E resulting in formation of loops in the network. 
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SEAD [24] protocol utilizes a one-way hash chain to prevent malicious from increasing the 
sequence number or decreasing the hop count in routing advertisement packets. Because different 
hash function is used, the attacker can never forge lower metric value, or greater sequence value. 
 
Table 1 : Various attacks, their causes and prevention 
 
Name of the 
Attack Causes Prevention Algorithm proposed 
Flooding Attack 
1) By initiating 
massive bogus route 
request (RREQ) packets. 
2) By initiating 
massive data packets. 
 
[6] Categorized all system nodes as 
strangers, acquaintances and friends 
depending on the trust level. After 
reaching the threshold level, further 
RREQ and data packets will not be 
entertained from a node. 
 Sleep Deprivation 
Attack 
Implemented by forcing 
the targeted node to use 
its vital resources by 
sending false requests 
1) [18] A cluster head forwards packets 
for a particular source-destination 
pair in its cluster until a threshold 
value (say 10 packets) is reached. 
After that the cluster head breaks its 
connection with that node. 
2) [19] Checks for the validity or non-
validity of the collected data and 
sends them marked as valid or non-
valid to the CIC. CIC takes the final 
decision for preventing the rate of 
false positive detection. 
Black hole Attack 
By sending pseudo RREP 
packet with modified 
higher sequence number 
to the source [7, 8]. 
 
1) [20] Finds more than one route to the 
destination and source then waits for 
receiving a number of paths having 
some common intermediate node. 
2) [21] Proposes TTSAODV routing 
protocol. The previous and the next 
hop of any intermediate node 
exchanges the verification messages 
to verify the attacker. 
Rushing Attack 
 
1) An attacker enhances 
its forwarding speed 
of RREQs by flooding 
the neighbouring 
nodes [9]. 
2) By transmitting 
RREQs at higher 
transmission power 
[9]. 
 
[9] described a set of generic 
mechanisms that together 
defend against the rushing attack which 
are secure Neighbor Detection, secure 
Route delegation and randomized 
ROUTE REQUEST forwarding. 
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Impersonation 
Attack 
 
1) By guessing the 
identity details of the 
authorized node. 
2) By disabling other 
node’s authentication 
mechanism 
1) Using digital signatures with 
SAODV [22] can be used. 
2) ARAN [23] provides authentication 
and non repudiation services using 
predetermined cryptographic 
certificates for end-to-end 
authentication. 
 3)  3)  
Routing Table 
Poisoning Attack 
 
1) By broadcasting false 
traffic and creating 
bogus entries in other 
nodes routing tables 
[1]. 
2) By generating RREQs 
with high sequence 
number resulting in 
deletion of legitimate 
routes [1]. 
 
SEAD [24] protocol utilizes a one-way 
hash chain to prevent malicious from 
increasing the sequence number or 
decreasing the hop count in routing 
advertisement packets. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This paper presented a number of popular attacks like DoS, sleep deprivation, black hole attack, 
routing table poisoning attack, impersonation and rushing attacks in MANETs. In Table 1 author 
had presented some of the methods to attack a network model along with some of the proposed 
solutions. Various issues that need to be addressed keeping in view the security of MANETS 
have also been highlighted. The need of the hour is to detect and prevent these attacks in a timely 
fashion in time. In the future work, the author would like to propose an integrated security system 
which will analyze the network for detecting the presence of these attacks. After detection of a 
particular attack author will try to pinpoint the attacker nodes and then mitigate their affect by 
excluding those nodes from the system. 
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